This paper investigates further on Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols based on classical error-correcting codes, previously proposed by the authors. In [1], the classic channel coding techniques were shown to be suitable, in particular conditions, instead of quantum error-correcting codes, for correcting errors that occur during the exchange of a cryptographic key between two authorized users. To this end, systematic parallel concatenated codes, also known as turbo codes, were proposed in [1] . In this paper we address the properties that the systematic parallel concatenated codes must have in order to be successfully used in a QKD protocol. In particular, we address the problem, not considered in [1] , that the constituent codes used in the parallel concatenation scheme must be such that the information sequence cannot be easily recovered from the encoder output sequences. In fact, the parallel classical channel on which to transmit only the redundancy bits is highly reliable but also public, i.e., very vulnerable as far as the attack attempts of a possible attacker are concerned.
INTRODUCTION
This paper investigates further on Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols based on classical error-correcting codes, previously proposed in [1] . The secret key is assumed to be transmitted over a quantum, and thus safe, channel, characterized by very low transmission rates and high error rates, due to the inherent characteristics of the system and the presence of a possible attacker. In order to cope with these high error rates and to obtain acceptable residual error rates, a parallel classical and public channel is used, conversely characterized by high transmission rates and low error rates, on which to transmit only the redundancy bits of parallel concatenated systematic channel codes.
We address the properties that the systematic parallel concatenated codes must have in order to be successfully used in a QKD protocol. In particular, we address the problem, not considered in [1] , that the constituent codes used in the parallel concatenation scheme must be such that the information sequence cannot be easily recovered from the encoder output sequences. In fact, the parallel classical channel on which to transmit only the redundancy bits is highly reliable but also public, i.e., very vulnerable as far as the attack attempts of a possible attacker are concerned.
On the basis of the study performed in [2] , we can derive, from the nonsystematic encoders analysis presented there, some hints for the design of constituent codes, to be used in parallel concatenation schemes, suitable for QKD systems. In particular, in [2] , the structure of rate R = 1/2 nonsystematic feedback convolutional encoders was investigated from the point of view of their invertibility, i.e., of "how easy" it is to recover the information sequence from the output of the encoder itself.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the QKD fundamentals. In Section 3, the quantum gaussian channel model, introduced in [1] , is recalled for self consistency sake. In Section 4, we present the properties that the systematic parallel concatenated codes must have in order to be successfully used in a QKD protocol. In Section 5 we present the evaluation of the codes, found in Section 4, applying the union bound and adapting it to the communication system considered. Finally, Section 6 summarizes and concludes the paper.
QKD FUNDAMENTALS
Quantum theory is based on a fundamental physical principle, stated at the beginning of 900: a material system can be known only if it is measured with some instruments, but the measure in some way changes it. The phenomenon occurs on sub-atomic level when making measurements on photons. Quantum cryptography (or Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)) uses this principle to build a communication channel which cannot be intercepted. It is defined by a set of protocols, systems and procedures to produce and distribute cryptographic keys that are used by mathematically secure systems to encrypt, transmit and decipher information. It has two undeniable advantages over traditional encryption:
1. it is based on the validity of universally accepted laws of physics combined with cryptographic techniques whose inviolability is guaranteed by a mathematical proof;
2. it allows to reveal the presence of a possible attack (eavesdropping).
Quantum cryptography has left the world of theory for over 15 years and is now leaving the research laboratories to be integrated into industrial products. Proper implementation of a quantum system requires an absolute control of both the technological means of coding and of the media (how the photon will travel in air or in an optical fiber). Some large companies in the world of Information Technology (IT) have invested a lot in QKD, but also some specific companies arose, having as core business the development and the sale of QKD equipments. The most famous are Toshiba, NEC and Corning, examples of big corporations interested in QKD, with a daily experience in the laboratories, but that
have not yet submitted a complete product on the market. All these companies exploit a version of quantum encryption based on a quantum communication channel over optical fiber. These advanced technologies have significant costs and are thus accessible, for the moment, only to government or corporate groups with big budgets. Nevertheless, industrial prototypes have already been issued in Europe.
QUANTUM GAUSSIAN CHANNEL
Gaussian channels [3] play a quite central role in quantum information with continuous variables. Most prominently, they are models for optical fibers as noisy or lossy transmission lines.
Since Gaussian channels map Gaussian states onto Gaussian states, they are, up to displacements, completely characterized by their action on second moments. In this sense, a quantum Gaussian channel can be defined as a transformation of covariance matrices:
where G is a real symmetric 2N × 2N matrix and F is an arbitrary real 2N × 2N matrix [3] .
Eq. (1) is the most general form of a Gaussian channel. In more physical terms, the matrix F may be said, roughly speaking, to determine the attenuation part of the channel.
The matrix G originates from the quantum noise induced by the coupling with the environment.
Not every pair of matrices F and G result in a legitimate quantum channel: from complete positivity we have that
This inequality sign originates from the Heisenberg uncertainty principle. Eqs. (1) and (2) specify the Gaussian channel.
The practically most important Gaussian channel is probably the idealized action of a fiber [3] . Another important example in practice is the lossy channel. This channel loses photons and can be modelled by a beam splitter of transmittivity t ∈ [0, 1] with an empty port in which the vacuum is coupled in. Another important example is given by the channel that adds classical Gaussian noise to a quantum state. This channel can be represented by a random displacement in phase space having a classical Gaussian probability distribution. The Gaussian weight T (ρ), given by Eq. (9) in [3] , is reflected as a map:
with a positive matrix G.
The interested reader can find other examples of quantum Gaussian channels in [3] .
TURBO CODES FOR QKD PROTOCOLS
represent a rate R = 1/2 nonsystematic feedback convolutional encoder, whose structure is shown in Fig. 1 . To recover the information sequence from the output of the encoder, we need an inverse matrix, i.e., a 2 × 1 matrix
for some l ≥ 0.
We recall here, for self consistency sake, that a rate R = 1/2 nonsystematic convolutional encoder G(D) that has a weight-two feedforward inverse 
Moreover, if u(D) represents the information sequence and
represents the encoder output, we obtain:
where u(D) can be recovered from the encoder output V(D) using an encoder inverse with weight only two.
In contrast to nonsystematic encoders, systematic feedback encoders have a trivial feedforward inverse
with A = 1 where
An example of an 8-state systematic feedback encoder is given in Table 1 . Since nonsystematic QLI encoders have A = 2, they can be considered as "almost systematic". Encoders with feedforward inverses G −1 (D) of weight three are called Easy-Look-In (ELI) [4] , and encoders whose inverses have small weight, but weight greater than three, are called Nearly-Quick-Look-In (NQLI) [5] . In Table 1 , examples of an 8-state ELI feedback encoder and an 8-state NQLI feedback encoder with feedforward inverses of weight 3 and 4, respectively, are given.
Since we are interested in encoders for which the information sequence cannot be easily recovered from the encoder output sequence, and the number of parity bits that affect the value of an information bit is equal to the weight of (number of nonzero terms in) the feedforward encoder inverse, we will focus our attention on nonsystematic feedback encoders with high weight feedforward inverses.
The analysis performed in [2] can be easily extended to the case in which a systematic turbo code is used to transmit the information, i.e., the secret key, over a quantum, and thus safe, channel, and the parity bits over a parallel classical and public channel. The structure of this encoder is shown in Fig. 2 .
In this case, in fact, the Parallel Concatenated Convolutional Code (PCCC) outputs which are to be transmitted on the public channel may be written as:
We can notice that for each permutation algorithm π and for each polynomial associated to the information sequence u(D), there exists a polynomial m(D) such that:
and, thus, the encoder output v2π(D) may be rewritten as:
If we assume, again, a weight-two feedforward inverse of the original rate R = 1/2 nonsystematic encoder of Fig. 1, i. e.,
T we get, applying (11), (6), and (10):
If u(D) and π(u(D)) coincide in (12), i.e., no interleaver is interposed to concatenate the constituent codes, (12) coincides with (6) . Namely, with the objective of obtaining u(D) from the vector V PCCC(D) and the feedforward inverse G −1 (D) of the code in Fig. 1 , the term [π(u(D)) + u(D)] may be seen as a "distortion factor" depending from the interleaving mechanism. From (12) it is evident also that the weight of the feedforward inverse of the original rate R = 1/2 nonsystematic encoder of Fig. 1 plays a role also in determining the information sequence starting from the parity check sequence of a turbo encoder. Thus, it makes sense to focus the attention on nonsystematic feedback encoders with high weight feedforward inverses in order to guarantee that the information sequence cannot be easily recovered from the encoder output sequence also when the corresponding systematic turbo encoder of Fig. 2 is used.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION RESULTS
As shown in Fig. 3 , the communication system consists in two parallel channels, namely: 
Quick-Look-In (QLI):
Easy-Look-In (ELI):
g2 ( Thus, the secret key may be considered as an information word u(D) to which it is possible to apply a channel coding V PCCC(D) in order to further protect its sensitive content.
To encode the secret key we assume to use a rate R = 1/3 eight state Parallel Concatenated Convolutional Code (PCCC), also known as "turbo code", given by the parallel concatenation, through an interleaver of length K, of a rate-1/2 systematic convolutional upper code and a rate-1 convolutional lower code. This parallel concatenation may be seen as the concatenation of an information word u(D), to be transmitted on a private quantum channel, with a redundancy V PCCC(D) (given by (9)) to be transmitted on a parallel classical public channel (see Fig. 3 ). To guarantee that the information sequence cannot be easily recovered from the encoder output sequence,
may be taken from Table 1 among the G(D)'s with higher weight feedforward inverse.
Denote by wm the minimum weight of an input sequence generating an error event of the parallel concatenated code C, and by h m and hM the minimum and maximum weight, respectively, of the codewords of C. Also, let A C w,h denote the Input-Output Weight Enumerating Function (IOWEF), the number of codewords in code C with input weight w and output weight h. Similarly, we define A
for the upper constituent code CU and the lower constituent code C L, respectively.
A C
w,h can be calculated by replacing the actual interleaver with the uniform interleaver [6] and exploiting its properties. The uniform interleaver of length K transforms an input sequence of weight w at the input of the upper constituent encoder into all its distinct K w permutations. As a consequence, each input sequence of the upper code of weight w, through the action of the uniform interleaver, enters the lower constituent encoder generating K w codewords of the lower code. The IOWEF of the overall PCCC can then be evaluated from the knowledge of the IOWEFs of C U and CL [6] :
where h, hU , and hL are related by the equation h = hU +hL.
Assume that the systematic part of the PCCC described above is transmitted over a quantum channel and the redundancy at the output of the two constituent codes on an AWGN channel. Moreover, assume to use a modulation with PSK/PAM binary decoding and maximum likelihood (ML). Assume further that the quantum channel can be modelled as an equivalent binary symmetric channel (BSC) with error probability Q [7] . Assume, finally, the quantum channel to be Gaussian: thus, given its error probability Q it can be treated as a soft-decision AWGN channel with signal-tonoise-ratio:
Since the communication system consists in two parallel channels, namely a quantum channel, with signal-to-noiseratio SNR Q given by (14), on which to transmit the information of weight w, and a parallel classical public channel, with signal-to-noise-ratio SNR P, on which to transmit the redundancy of weight h − w, the bit error probability of a PCCC over this system can be upper bounded by [6] 
where
Likewise, the frame error probability is upper bounded by
In Fig. 4 we give the union bounds on the bit error probability (BER) for the rate-1/3 PCCC with generators given in Table 1 for the NQLI code (with weight 4 feedforward inverse). Here, the block length is K = 500 bits. The black curve with no markers reports the union bound results obtained when both the secret key and the redundancy are assumed to be transmitted on the classical AWGN channel.
The colored curves with markers report the union bound results obtained applying (15) with the quantum channel error probability Q ranging from 0.05 to 0.2: this corresponds to the transmission of the secret key on a quantum channel with fixed error probability Q and of the redundancy on the classical AWGN channel.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have studied Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols based on classical error-correcting codes. The communication system consists in two parallel channels, namely a private quantum, and thus secure, channel, on which to transmit the secret key, and a parallel classical public channel, on which to transmit a binary redundancy.
A systematic parallel concatenated scheme has been used and the properties it should have to be successfully used in a QKD protocol have been investigated. In particular, we have addressed the problem that the constituent codes used in the parallel concatenation scheme must be such that the information sequence cannot be easily recovered from the encoder output sequences. In fact, the parallel classical channel on which to transmit only the redundancy bits is highly reliable but also public, i.e., very vulnerable as far as the attack attempts of a possible attacker are concerned. 
